Maria-Mercedes Hering, Donate Hindrichs, Anna Lena Hohmann, Julius Lang and Alexandra Ugrai<\/p>\n
student group at Ludwig-Maximilians-Universit\u00e4t<\/strong> Abstract: <\/strong>Over the past few years, the European Union has faced and needed to overcome the threat of euroscepticism; even quite wealthy countries like Germany have witnessed such sentiments emerge. Therefore, this article argues that the EU crisis, and more precisely social disintegration, is not merely a question of economics, but rather a crisis of identity which has led to alienation between the EU and its citizens. In order to overcome fragmentation and scepticism and to strengthen European identity, this paper identifies direct democracy at the European level and enhanced parliamentary cooperation as two strategies to bolster democratic accountability.<\/em><\/p>\n Since the financial crisis of 2007 and the recent public debt crisis, the European Union has been confronted with mistrust, scepticism or even outright rejection. But economic weakness is not the only trigger of such sentiments; even strong countries like Germany face euroscepticism. In light of such developments, this article focuses on the importance of social disintegration and political change within the EU, placing particular focus on the alienation between the union and its citizens. This is an extremely important development to consider as a \u201cgrowing number of people have turned their back on Europe\u201d (Emmanouilidis 2014:12).<\/p>\n This article begins by explaining the EU\u2019s critical condition through the nexus between the consequences of European crises and the rise of eurosceptic parties which are a manifestation of social disintegration. This report then turns its attention to European identity, with democracy as its cornerstone. Here we show that even the beneficiaries of the crisis face social dilemmas. The following section analyses the fragmentation stemming from the aforementioned problem. To put theory into practice, this report identifies two strategies\u2014namely empowering European citizens through direct democracy in the EU and strengthening accountability and legitimacy through enhanced parliamentary cooperation\u2014to bridge the gulf between the European Union and its citizens.<\/p>\n Nexus between the consequences of European crisis and the rise of eurosceptic parties<\/strong><\/p>\n Europe is currently facing a number of complex and extremely interlinked crises posing a fundamental threat to the continued existence of the EU itself. Besides the economic crisis, which includes the banking and public debt crisis, the EU must handle an institutional crisis in which its citizens display significant mistrust of the EU\u2019s institutions. The social dimension can be seen as the most serious issue, putting the EU under pressure (Stevenson 2014:23). The misery of the social crisis can be seen by skyrocketing unemployment rates, particularly among youth. A further debilitating effect on the EU is the widening gap between wealthier and poorer nations. The EU\u2019s inability to initiate reform and the complexity in decision-making round off this chorus of criticism.<\/p>\n According to the Standard Eurobarometer 82 from autumn 2014, only 14% of the EU 28 \u201ctend to trust\u201d in political parties, compared to 80% of European citizens who \u201ctend not to trust\u201d them (European Commission 2014:38). The scope and seriousness of the aforementioned problems caused by the crisis are also reflected by the outcomes of the 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections. 36% of the seats in the EP are occupied by eurosceptics, compared to only approximately 20% in 2009 (The Economist<\/em> 2014). It is also striking that both sides of the political aisle pose a threat to the EU. Despite their widely different ideological roots most of these eurosceptic parties can be categorised as anti-establishment and populist movements, manifesting themselves in their programmatic stance. By questioning the political system and offering merely populist solutions, these parties pose a threat to the European project itself.<\/p>\n Democracy: The cornerstone of European identity<\/strong><\/p>\n The legal and political basis for suretyship is the Copenhagen European Summit of 1973 where the Declaration of European Identity was ratified (CVCE 2013). Their definition of a European identity involved a \u201cunity \u2026 of the community\u201d, \u201cthe European identity in relation to the world\u201d and the \u201cdynamic nature \u2026 of a united Europe\u201d (Radelji\u0107 2014:4). The 1993 Treaty of Maastricht was a step towards a stronger European identity, a milestone in the European integration process (Bekemans 2014:36).<\/p>\n One of the characteristics of Europe is that it is the product of a diversity of citizens and their cultural characteristics. Bekemans (2014) argues that \u201cEurope should be seen as an added (enriched) value to our multiple identities. The European identity relates to a community of shared values such as solidarity, \u2026 respect for diversity \u2026 and human dignity\u201d (24\u201325).<\/p>\n In fact, it is striking that most contemporary research neglects the relationship between political elites and their demos<\/em> \u2014 the core of democracy. Therefore, it is advisable to connect democracy with the European identity, and we believe that democracy is the cornerstone of Europeanness. The EU integration process has been an elite project from the very beginning \u2014 without direct democratic legitimation. This was acceptable in times where the remit of the EU was limited in its competences and its decisions were indirectly legitimized by the national parliaments due to the dominance of the principle of unanimity in the Council. Nowadays, the EU is equipped with a wider range of competencies, causing a lack of democratic legitimacy. Additionally, the increased use of majority decisions weakens the control of national parliaments over EU decisions. We conclude that the EU needs to develop its own democratic legitimacy.<\/p>\n European identity at a turning point<\/strong><\/p>\n As stated above, the current EU crisis is not merely a question of economics. Indeed, it is mainly an identity crisis, the diminished trust of European citizens in the EU reflected by the last European Parliament elections. As the democratic principle lies at the core of European identity, the enlarged competencies of the EP and its comparatively decreased democratic legitimacy deprive countries and citizens of the right of consultation. When countries, parties or citizens turn their back on the international arena, fragmentation occurs, putting the European identity under pressure.<\/p>\n We regard the so-called politicisation of European integration as the theoretical framework of the growing tendency toward euroscepticism, described by Wilde (2011) as \u201can increase in polarization of opinions, interest or values and the extent to which they are publicly advanced towards the process of policy formulation within the EU\u201d (560). The main indicators of politicisation in the EU, according to Schimmelfennig, Leuffen and Rittberger (2015), are mass level salience and opposition to European integration, the mobilisation of eurosceptic public opinion by eurosceptic parties and opportunities to voice eurosceptic opinions in national referenda or EP elections (771).<\/p>\n Germany is perceived as one of the main beneficiaries of the eurozone and coped successfully with the European debt crisis (Young & Semmler 2011). Meanwhile, EU member states like Greece, Spain and Italy have suffered enormously from the consequences of the crisis and are still struggling to overcome the critical economic situation. Despite the economic strength Germany has maintained throughout the European crisis, eurosceptic sentiments have emerged within the country while positive attitudes towards the European project decline, evidenced by the rise of the eurosceptic party Alternative for Germany (AfD). Therefore, an economic explanation alone is insufficient at this European turning point. This leads to the conclusion that other factors beyond economic issues determine European citizens\u2019 attitudes towards European identity. EP campaigning in 2014 has shown various anti-European and eurosceptical sentiments on both edges of the landscape of political parties in Germany.<\/p>\n \u00a0The difficulty of fragmentation<\/strong><\/p>\n An analysis of fragmentation will enable us to focus on this question: What is European identity and how does fragmentation challenge European unity? Even in relatively prosperous EU states like Germany, euroscepticism has increased. Therefore, we assume that fragmentation threatens further European developments and its existence in the long term.<\/p>\n Globalisation and fragmentation work in opposite directions. Globalisation leads to a widening and deepening of interdependencies between states, thus forcing states to harmonise their policies with one another. In contrast, fragmentation means a reduction of these connections, thus decreasing the need for states to harmonise. Similarly, globalisation lessens the importance of state borders while fragmentation fosters their meaning. If a country is forced to globalise faster and deeper than it wants to, the loss of sovereignty can lead to scepticism concerning further developments (Rittberger 2010:78\u201380). Decisions made without or against a state can increase fragmentation, too, as the state may be driven to oppose the deciding entity. But as globalisation does not reach all parts of the world with the same intensity, some states are less globalised than others and witness fragmentation over a longer period of time. Also, democratic deficits and feelings of impotence concerning international relations can wear out states\u2019 trust in international organizations and lead to an intended fragmentation (Rittberger 2010:106\u201309). These mechanisms of fragmentation occur in Europe today.<\/p>\n Currently, Europe is witnessing increasing fragmentation. Recently, eurosceptic parties have gained more and more power in the EU, especially in the EP. Fragmentation is certainly not a new phenomenon in the European party system, but recent developments \u201cprovided a fertile ground for populist \u2018anti-forces\u2019 \u2014 anti-EU, antieuro, antimigration, antiestablishment \u2014 on both the left and right of the political spectrum\u201d (Emmanouilidis 2014:99).<\/p>\n The economic crisis is still having a big impact on Europe. The solutions to this problem have often been changed, corrected and decried as failures. Insecurities endanger the unity of the EU. For this paper, the fragmentation between EU citizens and the political decision makers is of special interest. \u201cThere is a widespread feeling that the EU has \u2026 been \u2018part of the problem\u2019, poisoning national debates and public attitudes\u201d (Emmanouilidis 2014:98). Europeans are wondering whether the EU and the decisionmakers represent their country well. Meanwhile, fragmentation between the EU member states and their national societies has caused a wave of reinforced nationalism and prejudices, leading to a stereotype-biased mistrust between nations. Interpretive fragmentation is another concept whereby the varying living conditions of EU citizens challenge their understanding of the circumstances in other countries (Emmanouilidis 2014:99). All of these forms of fragmentation can affect a state itself, causing fragmentation between the nation state and its citizens. In the EU, these problems are more important than elsewhere, as the opinions of each member state and its parties can affect their opinion on EU policies heavily.<\/p>\n Empowering European citizens through direct democracy<\/strong><\/p>\n In order to address the EU\u2019s direct democracy deficit, the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) included an element of direct democracy at the European level for the first time (Obwexer & Villotti 2010:108). The European Citizens\u2019 Initiative (ECI), as \u201cthe first supranational instrument of direct democracy, creates an additional direct link\u201d (Garc\u00eda et al. 2012:2) between EU citizens and the institutions of the union. We see great opportunity in its ability to strengthen transnational democracy.<\/p>\n Since its introduction in 2012, EU citizens are able to participate directly in political decision-making. The establishment of the ECI thus raises the question whether it can diminish the direct democracy deficit and whether it is an efficient tool for generating participation and thus fostering European identity. In order to answer this question, we evaluated whether the ECI is a newly established input mechanism conveying citizens\u2019 concerns with higher efficiency into European politics. Therefore, we measured the efficiency of the ECI by referring to the input and output model of EU legitimacy by Scharpf (1999:16). He assumes that the EU possesses a lack of input efficiency because socioeconomic, institutional and cultural diversity interfere in the development of an overarching European identity. Three criteria that appear relevant to us helped us to measure the ECI\u2019s efficiency: enforceability, relevance and motivation. We have chosen the four most popular citizen initiatives in order to create validity and have analysed them on the basis of the three aforementioned criteria. Even though these four initiatives have been civil concerns since the introduction of the ECI, the EU citizens\u2019 concerns raised neither public attention nor awareness due to a lack of an enforcement mechanism. Our evaluation of the input efficiency of the four initiatives shows clearly that EU citizens\u2019 concerns have been addressed with greater frequency since the implementation of the ECI, but there have yet to be any concrete policy changes on these issues.<\/p>\n To summarise, the lack of input efficiency has been addressed in the first real direct-democratic instrument, the ECI. This leads us to the assumption that the ECI has the capability to establish governance by the EU citizens. However, it is debatable whether the ECI is a well-constructed mechanism with the ability to convey citizens\u2019 concerns into EU politics. Currently, EU citizens may launch an ECI but the Commission can refuse these proposals. This mechanism unfortunately does not bridge the gulf of the direct-democratic deficit of the EU due to organisational and technical problems. Thus, the chain of command has to be changed from a top-down to a stronger bottom-up process. So far, we do not see the ECI as a real direct-democratic instrument.<\/p>\n How can direct democracy be improved and European identity strengthened? We are in need of a stronger participatory union equipped with involvement of citizens in EU policy-making. As demonstrated above, we should avoid high expectations concerning the political potential and the direct democratic influence of the ECI. But current literature offers recommendations as well as reasons why it definitely is favourable that the ECI continue to develop. Our first recommendation presents the most promising measures to overcome major obstacles currently facing the initiative. Firstly, a Citizens\u2019 Initiative Centre could be established \u201cas a one-stop shop for support and information to ECI organisers\u201d (Ballesteros et al. 2014:53). Consisting of an office and an online platform, such a centre could offer services such as supporting the search for potential partners, replying to information requests of any kind and providing detailed guidelines on the rights of the ECI organisers and all administrative procedures through the ECI process (Ballesteros et al. 2014:53). Secondly, ECISs should have the ability to require implementation through treaty amendments (ECI Campaign 2015). There are innumerable issues that are important to citizens requiring EU treaty changes. As the Commission has the right to do so on its own, the ECI should also have the power to propose treaty alterations. This measure would strengthen bottom-up developments, as citizens would have influence in adjusting treaties and therefore a say in EU politics. With these recommendations the ECI\u2019s influence will undoubtedly be increased so that in the future the ECI will become a more successful connecting mechanism between European citizens and EU institutions like the Commission.<\/p>\n Our second proposal is the establishment of real direct-democratic instruments following the Swiss model. Switzerland offers its citizens three mechanisms to participate in political decision-making and increase their discretionary competence. Popular initiatives for constitutional amendment and obligatory or optional referenda ought to be introduced on the European level (Baglioni 2004:93). This approach could increase the union\u2019s democratic legitimacy and should strengthen a pro-European direction as one can assume \u201ca more vibrant political participative landscape\u201d (Baglioni 2004:93). We are convinced that a participative EU can stimulate citizens\u2019 interest in politics and potentially weaken citizens\u2019 scepticism of European institutions. Real direct-democratic elements can halt political apathy in Europe.<\/p>\n We highly recommend introducing participative elements on the European level to generate a prosperous future for a common Europe. In our opinion, European identity can be strengthened in this manner, thus setting a pro-European direction and shifting the turning point from social disintegration to social integration.<\/p>\n Strengthening accountability and legitimacy through enhanced parliamentary cooperation<\/strong><\/p>\n Many EU citizens feel uncomfortable with ongoing EU integration and the increasing significance of the decisions made in Brussels in their daily lives because they \u201cfeel they cannot influence the formulation of policies\u201d (Emmanouilidis 2014:12). The opaque, often incomprehensible and complex decision-making system is not only a breeding ground for eurosceptic parties, but it also has the potential to create a lack of democratic accountability and legitimacy. In order to heal this deficiency we argue for a strengthening and deepening of the cooperation of the EP and the national parliaments. Although treaty after treaty has progressively empowered the EP (Mayoral 2011:1), unilateral reinforcement of the EP has proven inefficient.<\/p>\n A cooperative approach between the EP and the national parliaments would consider that both \u2014 each at their level\u2014represent the very same citizens. Working together would ensure respect for the principle of subsidiarity and would enable them to reconstruct democratic legitimacy. By incorporating both levels, the consideration of their citizens\u2019 various needs could be guaranteed, thereby reinforcing the ties between representatives and the represented.<\/p>\n Interparliamentary cooperation has progressively improved. Since the Maastricht Treaty, the importance of deepening relations further has been acknowledged, and the Treaty of Lisbon endorsed the relevance of the involvement of national parliaments in EU parliamentary activities. Nevertheless, academic research on cooperative approaches offers some criticism. Winzen (2012) , for instance, raised the obvious question of how it could be measured effectively. Acknowledging such criticism, we still see the cooperation of the EP and national parliaments as a way to strengthen democratic accountability and legitimacy.<\/p>\n As demonstrated, solely advancing the existing cooperation procedure will not solve the democratic deficit. As the European project comes to a turning point, it requires a revolutionary change in its understanding of European parliamentarism.<\/p>\n European identity is at a turning point. Social disintegration, in our view the alienation between the EU and its citizens, is the primary threat to the continued existence of the EU. We outlined the nexus between the consequences of European crisis and the rise of eurosceptic parties contributing to social disintegration. It has become clear that the democratic principle is the cornerstone of both identities\u2014European and national. References <\/strong><\/p>\n Baglioni, S. (2004), \u201c The effects of direct democracy and city size on political participation: the Swiss case\u201d, in: Zittel, T. & Fuchs, D. (eds.), Participatory democracy and political participation. Can participatory engineering bring citizens back in?<\/em>, London, Routledge.<\/p>\n Ballesteros, M., Canetta, E. & Zaciu, A. (2014) \u201c European Citizens\u2019 Initiative\u2014first lessons of implementation, https:\/\/www.democracy-international.org\/sites\/democracy-international.org\/files\/pdf\/ep-study-ci.pdf<\/a>, accessed 20 Jun 2015.<\/p>\n Bekemans, L. (2014), \u201c Identity and identity-building in Europe : a citizenship perspective\u201d, in: Bogn\u00e1r, B. & Alm\u00e1si, Z. (eds.), Transfiguration of the European identity<\/em>, Newcastle.<\/p>\n CVCE (2013), \u201cDeclaration on European identity\u201d, Copenhagen, 14 Dec 1973, http:\/\/www.cvce.eu\/content\/publication\/1999\/1\/1\/02798dc9-9c69-4b7d-b2c9-f03a8db7da32\/publishable_en.pdf<\/a>, accessed 29 May 2015.<\/p>\n De Wilde, P. (2011), \u201c No polity for old politics? A framework for analysing the politicization of European integration\u201d, Journal of European Integration<\/em> 33 (5): 559\u201375.<\/p>\n ECI Campaign (2015), \u201c12 ways to build a European citizens\u2019 initiative that works!\u201d, http:\/\/www.citizens-initiative.eu\/wp content\/uploads\/2015\/02\/12_Recommendations.pdf<\/a>, accessed 20 Jun 2015.<\/p>\n The Economist <\/em>(2014), \u201cThe impact of the rise of antiestablishment parties, in Europe and abroad\u201d, 31 May 201 4 , http:\/\/www.economist.com\/news\/europe\/21603034-impact-rise-anti-establishment-parties-europe-and-abroad-eurosceptic-union<\/a>, accessed 29 May 2015.<\/p>\n Emmanouilidis, J. (2014), \u201cNew pact for Europe. Towards a new pact for Europe\u201d, 2nd report, King Baudouin Foundation, October 2014, http:\/\/www.newpactforeurope.eu\/documents\/new_pact_for_europe_2nd_report.pdf<\/a>, accessed 25 Nov 2015.<\/p>\n European Commission (2014), \u201cStandard Eurobarometer 82. Autumn 2014: Tables of results: public opinion in the European Union\u201d, http:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/public_opinion\/archives\/eb\/eb82\/eb82_anx_en.pdf<\/a> , accessed 29 May 2015.<\/p>\n
\nSupervisor: Johanna Schmidt-Jevtic, M.A.<\/p>\n
\nIn our opinion, democracy must be practiced and experienced at the European level and not solely at the national level. If the latter remains the case, fragmentation will expand. We believe two strategies could bolster EU democracy. The EU must reinforce direct democratic elements while guaranteeing and deepening cooperation between the EP and national parliaments. In the end, the EU must accept that only a change in its behaviour
\ncan lead towards a communitarian future.<\/p>\n