Commentary
What does it take for a politician with a migrant background to be fully accepted by constituents and colleagues? Take the late Tom Lantos, a Hungarian-born Holocaust survivor who served several decades in the US House of Representatives, where he was one of the most prolific foreign-policy voices. His thick Hungarian accent was no obstacle. Instead, his proud declaration to be “American by choice” removed any doubt about his Americanness. Contrast this story with that of Cem Özdemir, arguably the most-prominent German politician of migrant background. Even as chair of the Green Party, currently the third-most-popular party in Germany, journalists and fellow politicians still tend to associate him exclusively with his migration-policy expertise rather than with his preferred areas of interest. If he were not a native German speaker, (an avid user of his regional dialect at that), he most likely would not be a political leader in Germany at all.
As these examples show, identifying yourself as Hungarian-American, Indian-American or Cuban-American – “hyphenated identities” – will not exclude you from political integration in the United States, whereas in Germany such identities still lack acceptance. German politicians of Turkish descent need to declare themselves “fully” German to be entirely accepted.
This contrast is particularly conspicuous in the foreign-policy realm. People with migrant backgrounds may have foreign-policy interests related to their county of origin. While such interests may be legitimately pursued when hyphenated identities are accepted, they can be much harder to realise when such an acceptance is missing.
The Importance of Labels and Organization
When Congress codified the US trade embargo against Cuba in 1996, Cuban-American lobbyists and members of Congress were visibly involved in passing the law. In Germany, immigrants are far less prominent in the foreign-policymaking process, but are nevertheless avid participants.
The ways immigrants approach ethnically motivated foreign policy in the United States and Germany differ in many aspects. In the United States, immigrant participation is a regular part of the foreign-policymaking process. Cuban-Americans, for instance, voice their interests with regard to Cuba as members of Congress, as lobbyists or simply as voters. When Congress codified the US trade embargo against Cuba in 1996, Cuban-American lobbyists and members of Congress were visibly involved in passing the law. In Germany, immigrants are far less prominent in the foreign-policymaking process, but are nevertheless avid participants. One reason for this is that, unlike immigrants in the United States, immigrants in Germany pursue their foreign-policy interests primarily through political parties rather than interest groups. The most-common channel for political mobilization by ethnically motivated interests in the United States is ethnic interest groups; the ethnic label clearly identifies them as political actors motivated by migrant backgrounds.
Nevertheless, ethnic interest groups do exist in Germany, yet their labels widely differ from those of their US counterparts. American lobbying groups that represent the foreign-policy interests of immigrants are commonly referred to as “ethnic interest groups”. German groups of the same kind are commonly referred to as “Migrantenselbstorganisationen”, meaning immigrant self-organizations. This term in German implies that these groups somehow operate outside or independent of normal political channels, namely political parties.
Further, Germany-based groups tend to take on purely ethnic labels (such asTurkish or Kurdish), unlike their US counterparts who commonly operate under a hyphenated name (Cuban-American) or pan-ethnic label (Latino or Hispanic). In addition, many German entities also mobilize around religious rather than ethnic identities. For instance, part of the dialogue between the German federal government and the immigrant population over matters of integration takes place through religious political actors, such as the umbrella organizations Islamrat (Islamic Council) and Zentralrat der Muslime (Central Council of Muslims).
Drivers and Constraints of Political Integration
One major reason why immigrants in Germany are far less visible in the foreign-policymaking process than in the United States is, of course, the political system. While the German system is centred on political parties, the American system is more influenced by individual political entrepreneurs. It is therefore much easier for immigrants in the United States to engage in politics through special-interest groups such as ethnic ones. In Germany, the natural channel for immigrant engagement in foreign policy is the party system, where there is much less room for the pursuit of special interests.
The entrepreneurial American system is extraordinarily permeable to interest-group influence. It is characterized by strong individual actors, weak party organization, a highly-accessible Congress and, more recently, high turnover in politics. With regard to foreign policy, interest groups also profit from the US Constitution, which does not clearly demarcate the distribution of power in the realm of foreign policy. Edward S. Corwin, former head of the American Political Science Association, dubbed it “an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy”.
The German focus on political parties results in a more static political system that is less permeable to interest groups. An extended party career usually determines a person’s nomination in an electoral district or the placement on a party list, which distributes seats in parliament according to a hierarchy decided prior to the election. This system makes it difficult for political newcomers, including immigrants, to enter parliament. German political parties also provide less ideological room for manoeuvre than their American counterparts. Once elected to parliament, legislators are expected to vote and act along party lines. This coherence makes interest-group lobbying less attractive than it is in the US, as chances of success are comparatively small.
Citizenship is another factor that impacts immigrant integration into politics in Germany and the United States. Even though in both countries lobbyists do not need to be citizens, the German focus on political parties grants German citizens privileged access to political decision-making – thus limiting immigrant participation. Moreover, German citizenship is harder for some people to obtain than US citizenship is. Despite reforms in 2000, German citizenship still is largely based on birthright rather than the territoriality principle. The naturalization rate has been on a downward slope for most of the last decade. One reason is the denial of dual citizenship – to which there are exceptions, but usually not for people of Turkish descent, Germany’s largest immigrant community. Furthermore, citizenship gained by naturalization may be revoked in certain circumstances. In the United States, citizenship is awarded permanently, and dual citizenship is tolerated (though not encouraged). US naturalization rates show an upward trend.
These differing approaches to citizenship reflect different national self-conceptions. While the United States defines itself as a country of immigration, Germany has only recently accepted that label. The hyphenated identities are in turn far less conceivable in Germany. People of Turkish origin living in Germany are, for example, commonly referred to as “Turks” rather than “Turkish-Germans”. By virtue of a more-idealistic approach toward citizenship in the United States, naturalized and indigenous Americans are more readily considered equals in terms of belonging to the nation. As the example of Mr. Lantos shows, the self-identification as “American” counts more toward acceptance than looks or accents. German society still struggles to accept citizens of colour and those with non-native accents. This is based on a more-rigid, though changing, perception of what a German should look and speak like. As a result, the desirability of US citizenship is comparatively strong. While naturalized US citizens proudly proclaim to be “American by choice”, no such expression exists in Germany.
National self-conception thus circumscribes the political space for immigrants and is reflected in societal attitudes toward immigration. Germany’s long resistance to defining itself as a country welcome to immigration was grounded in the belief that guest workers, who arrived between the 1950s and 1970s, would eventually return to their countries of origin. As a famous German statement goes, “They asked for labour and people came.” Many immigrants ended up staying, bringing their families, raising children and starting careers. In contrast, as a country of immigration, the United States expects immigrants to stay. These different attitudes affect the integration of immigrants into politics, in particular foreign policymaking.
Another reason that immigrants in the United States are more visible in the foreign-policymaking process is that the American public generally shows relatively low interest in foreign policy, which makes it easy for immigrant political actors to occupy a prominent place in the debate. US military engagement abroad may evoke interest, but regular bilateral relations generally do not. For instance, few Americans may have a deep interest in US policy toward the Dominican Republic, but Dominican-American interest groups certainly do.
The US political system is not only more accepting of hyphenated identities, it is also based on issue-specific coalitions.
In both countries, immigrants’ foreign-policy activism is more controversial than domestic-policy activism. Immigrants are accused of distorting the national interest by voicing their particular ethnic interests. However, it is more difficult for immigrants in Germany than in the United States to express interests that relate to another country, because of the low acceptance of hyphenated identities. The US political system is not only more accepting of hyphenated identities, it is also based on issue-specific coalitions. Each legislative project requires a coalition of different interests to be passed. Ethnic interests are as much a part of this process as, say, business interests.
Finally, resources such as time and education are needed to engage in politics. They are amassed through social mobility, which in the United States is the main channel for immigrants to integrate into American society. Social mobility of immigrants is promoted through a flexible labour market, strong anti-discrimination legislation and birthright citizenship. In Germany, the government seeks to promote integration through policies. While social mobility is the very means of integration in the United States, integration is a prerequisite for social mobility in Germany. As a result, it is more difficult to amass the resources necessary to participate in politics in Germany than it is in the United States.
Overcoming Obstacles of Political Integration
The value of immigrant political mobilization is obvious: It is a powerful means of, and an outcome of, integration. By making use of the political instruments offered by their new home country, immigrants demonstrate their integration on the political level. However, the very choice of political instruments may point toward deficiencies in integration. If political parties were more open to immigrants in Germany, maybe “self-organization” would become less attractive to them. At the same time, an enhanced acceptance of hyphenated identities would lend greater legitimacy to such groups, making the label of “self-organization” obsolete. As the US case shows, hyphenated identities make room for a broader acceptance of foreign policy activism by immigrants.
Thus, the struggle to embrace diversity in foreign policymaking plays out very differently on each side of the Atlantic. In Germany, it is much more complex and intense than in the United States. The large community of Turkish-Germans, in particular, faces many barriers to participation in political processes. These will not be removed easily. Nevertheless, while the political space that the United States offers immigrants in the realm of foreign policy is much larger, it still ignites controversy. The American debate centres on the question of whether ethnic interests distort the national interest. Given the pluralist thrust of the American national self-conception, however, the answer can only be negative. Yet, there is another conflict currently looming on the horizon. The current US job crisis has slowed down social mobility, the vehicle of integration. If the crisis persists, integration will become more difficult.
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Commentary
The Integration of Immigrants into German and US Foreign Policy Making: An Identity Question
Commentary
What does it take for a politician with a migrant background to be fully accepted by constituents and colleagues? Take the late Tom Lantos, a Hungarian-born Holocaust survivor who served several decades in the US House of Representatives, where he was one of the most prolific foreign-policy voices. His thick Hungarian accent was no obstacle. Instead, his proud declaration to be “American by choice” removed any doubt about his Americanness. Contrast this story with that of Cem Özdemir, arguably the most-prominent German politician of migrant background. Even as chair of the Green Party, currently the third-most-popular party in Germany, journalists and fellow politicians still tend to associate him exclusively with his migration-policy expertise rather than with his preferred areas of interest. If he were not a native German speaker, (an avid user of his regional dialect at that), he most likely would not be a political leader in Germany at all.
As these examples show, identifying yourself as Hungarian-American, Indian-American or Cuban-American – “hyphenated identities” – will not exclude you from political integration in the United States, whereas in Germany such identities still lack acceptance. German politicians of Turkish descent need to declare themselves “fully” German to be entirely accepted.
This contrast is particularly conspicuous in the foreign-policy realm. People with migrant backgrounds may have foreign-policy interests related to their county of origin. While such interests may be legitimately pursued when hyphenated identities are accepted, they can be much harder to realise when such an acceptance is missing.
The Importance of Labels and Organization
When Congress codified the US trade embargo against Cuba in 1996, Cuban-American lobbyists and members of Congress were visibly involved in passing the law. In Germany, immigrants are far less prominent in the foreign-policymaking process, but are nevertheless avid participants.
The ways immigrants approach ethnically motivated foreign policy in the United States and Germany differ in many aspects. In the United States, immigrant participation is a regular part of the foreign-policymaking process. Cuban-Americans, for instance, voice their interests with regard to Cuba as members of Congress, as lobbyists or simply as voters. When Congress codified the US trade embargo against Cuba in 1996, Cuban-American lobbyists and members of Congress were visibly involved in passing the law. In Germany, immigrants are far less prominent in the foreign-policymaking process, but are nevertheless avid participants. One reason for this is that, unlike immigrants in the United States, immigrants in Germany pursue their foreign-policy interests primarily through political parties rather than interest groups. The most-common channel for political mobilization by ethnically motivated interests in the United States is ethnic interest groups; the ethnic label clearly identifies them as political actors motivated by migrant backgrounds.
Nevertheless, ethnic interest groups do exist in Germany, yet their labels widely differ from those of their US counterparts. American lobbying groups that represent the foreign-policy interests of immigrants are commonly referred to as “ethnic interest groups”. German groups of the same kind are commonly referred to as “Migrantenselbstorganisationen”, meaning immigrant self-organizations. This term in German implies that these groups somehow operate outside or independent of normal political channels, namely political parties.
Further, Germany-based groups tend to take on purely ethnic labels (such asTurkish or Kurdish), unlike their US counterparts who commonly operate under a hyphenated name (Cuban-American) or pan-ethnic label (Latino or Hispanic). In addition, many German entities also mobilize around religious rather than ethnic identities. For instance, part of the dialogue between the German federal government and the immigrant population over matters of integration takes place through religious political actors, such as the umbrella organizations Islamrat (Islamic Council) and Zentralrat der Muslime (Central Council of Muslims).
Drivers and Constraints of Political Integration
One major reason why immigrants in Germany are far less visible in the foreign-policymaking process than in the United States is, of course, the political system. While the German system is centred on political parties, the American system is more influenced by individual political entrepreneurs. It is therefore much easier for immigrants in the United States to engage in politics through special-interest groups such as ethnic ones. In Germany, the natural channel for immigrant engagement in foreign policy is the party system, where there is much less room for the pursuit of special interests.
The entrepreneurial American system is extraordinarily permeable to interest-group influence. It is characterized by strong individual actors, weak party organization, a highly-accessible Congress and, more recently, high turnover in politics. With regard to foreign policy, interest groups also profit from the US Constitution, which does not clearly demarcate the distribution of power in the realm of foreign policy. Edward S. Corwin, former head of the American Political Science Association, dubbed it “an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy”.
The German focus on political parties results in a more static political system that is less permeable to interest groups. An extended party career usually determines a person’s nomination in an electoral district or the placement on a party list, which distributes seats in parliament according to a hierarchy decided prior to the election. This system makes it difficult for political newcomers, including immigrants, to enter parliament. German political parties also provide less ideological room for manoeuvre than their American counterparts. Once elected to parliament, legislators are expected to vote and act along party lines. This coherence makes interest-group lobbying less attractive than it is in the US, as chances of success are comparatively small.
Citizenship is another factor that impacts immigrant integration into politics in Germany and the United States. Even though in both countries lobbyists do not need to be citizens, the German focus on political parties grants German citizens privileged access to political decision-making – thus limiting immigrant participation. Moreover, German citizenship is harder for some people to obtain than US citizenship is. Despite reforms in 2000, German citizenship still is largely based on birthright rather than the territoriality principle. The naturalization rate has been on a downward slope for most of the last decade. One reason is the denial of dual citizenship – to which there are exceptions, but usually not for people of Turkish descent, Germany’s largest immigrant community. Furthermore, citizenship gained by naturalization may be revoked in certain circumstances. In the United States, citizenship is awarded permanently, and dual citizenship is tolerated (though not encouraged). US naturalization rates show an upward trend.
These differing approaches to citizenship reflect different national self-conceptions. While the United States defines itself as a country of immigration, Germany has only recently accepted that label. The hyphenated identities are in turn far less conceivable in Germany. People of Turkish origin living in Germany are, for example, commonly referred to as “Turks” rather than “Turkish-Germans”. By virtue of a more-idealistic approach toward citizenship in the United States, naturalized and indigenous Americans are more readily considered equals in terms of belonging to the nation. As the example of Mr. Lantos shows, the self-identification as “American” counts more toward acceptance than looks or accents. German society still struggles to accept citizens of colour and those with non-native accents. This is based on a more-rigid, though changing, perception of what a German should look and speak like. As a result, the desirability of US citizenship is comparatively strong. While naturalized US citizens proudly proclaim to be “American by choice”, no such expression exists in Germany.
National self-conception thus circumscribes the political space for immigrants and is reflected in societal attitudes toward immigration. Germany’s long resistance to defining itself as a country welcome to immigration was grounded in the belief that guest workers, who arrived between the 1950s and 1970s, would eventually return to their countries of origin. As a famous German statement goes, “They asked for labour and people came.” Many immigrants ended up staying, bringing their families, raising children and starting careers. In contrast, as a country of immigration, the United States expects immigrants to stay. These different attitudes affect the integration of immigrants into politics, in particular foreign policymaking.
Another reason that immigrants in the United States are more visible in the foreign-policymaking process is that the American public generally shows relatively low interest in foreign policy, which makes it easy for immigrant political actors to occupy a prominent place in the debate. US military engagement abroad may evoke interest, but regular bilateral relations generally do not. For instance, few Americans may have a deep interest in US policy toward the Dominican Republic, but Dominican-American interest groups certainly do.
The US political system is not only more accepting of hyphenated identities, it is also based on issue-specific coalitions.
In both countries, immigrants’ foreign-policy activism is more controversial than domestic-policy activism. Immigrants are accused of distorting the national interest by voicing their particular ethnic interests. However, it is more difficult for immigrants in Germany than in the United States to express interests that relate to another country, because of the low acceptance of hyphenated identities. The US political system is not only more accepting of hyphenated identities, it is also based on issue-specific coalitions. Each legislative project requires a coalition of different interests to be passed. Ethnic interests are as much a part of this process as, say, business interests.
Finally, resources such as time and education are needed to engage in politics. They are amassed through social mobility, which in the United States is the main channel for immigrants to integrate into American society. Social mobility of immigrants is promoted through a flexible labour market, strong anti-discrimination legislation and birthright citizenship. In Germany, the government seeks to promote integration through policies. While social mobility is the very means of integration in the United States, integration is a prerequisite for social mobility in Germany. As a result, it is more difficult to amass the resources necessary to participate in politics in Germany than it is in the United States.
Overcoming Obstacles of Political Integration
The value of immigrant political mobilization is obvious: It is a powerful means of, and an outcome of, integration. By making use of the political instruments offered by their new home country, immigrants demonstrate their integration on the political level. However, the very choice of political instruments may point toward deficiencies in integration. If political parties were more open to immigrants in Germany, maybe “self-organization” would become less attractive to them. At the same time, an enhanced acceptance of hyphenated identities would lend greater legitimacy to such groups, making the label of “self-organization” obsolete. As the US case shows, hyphenated identities make room for a broader acceptance of foreign policy activism by immigrants.
Thus, the struggle to embrace diversity in foreign policymaking plays out very differently on each side of the Atlantic. In Germany, it is much more complex and intense than in the United States. The large community of Turkish-Germans, in particular, faces many barriers to participation in political processes. These will not be removed easily. Nevertheless, while the political space that the United States offers immigrants in the realm of foreign policy is much larger, it still ignites controversy. The American debate centres on the question of whether ethnic interests distort the national interest. Given the pluralist thrust of the American national self-conception, however, the answer can only be negative. Yet, there is another conflict currently looming on the horizon. The current US job crisis has slowed down social mobility, the vehicle of integration. If the crisis persists, integration will become more difficult.
Tags: Commentary